R (Evans) v. Attorney General (UKSC, 2015): The Clash Between Royal Confidentiality and the Principle of Openness
“Right to know vs. royal confidentiality” — the Evans case sat at the center when two traditions of the UK constitution collided head-on.
Hello, everyone! Today we’re looking at one of the most intriguing cases in UK public law, R (Evans) v. Attorney General (2015). This dispute began when Guardian journalist Rob Evans requested disclosure of the then-Prince of Wales’s (now Charles III) letters to government departments — the so-called “black spider memos.” Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the Environmental Information Regulations (EIR), disclosure was ordered, but the Attorney General exercised a special veto to overturn that order. Whether that exercise of power was lawful became the core issue. When I first read this case, I wondered, “Can the executive really overturn a court’s decision like that?” The Supreme Court’s conclusion makes very clear where the UK constitution stands on the rule of law and transparency. In STEP 1, here’s the table of contents so you can see the big picture at a glance!
Table of Contents
Case Overview: The start of the dispute over disclosure of the “spider memos”
The Evans case began when Guardian journalist Rob Evans sought disclosure of letters the Prince of Wales sent around 2004–2005 to various government ministers — personal and policy views known as the “black spider memos.” Relying on FOIA and the EIR, the Information Commissioner decided that most of the documents should be disclosed, and the Court of Appeal agreed. However, the Attorney General then exercised FOIA’s “special veto” (the certification power) to overturn the courts’ disclosure order. Whether the executive can effectively neutralise a judicial decision triggered a constitutional debate that reached the Supreme Court.
Key Issues: Scope of FOIA’s special veto and the force of court judgments
The central question was whether the executive could rely on section 53 of FOIA to nullify a judicial decision already ordering disclosure. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the provision exists but examined closely how far it extends and what standards prevent its abuse. The table below structures the core issues addressed in Evans.
| Issue | Explanation |
|---|---|
| Legal limits of the special veto | Can the executive overturn a court’s decision? If so, to what extent? |
| Rule of law and separation of powers | Is executive nullification of judicial judgments compatible with constitutional principles? |
| Scope of protecting royal neutrality | How far can the tradition of shielding royal papers prevail over the principle of disclosure? |
The Supreme Court’s Judgment: Limiting abuse of the executive veto
By a 5–2 majority, the Supreme Court held that the special veto cannot be used in a way that effectively overturns a court’s determination, ruling in Evans’s favor. The majority stated that to nullify a judicial disclosure order, the executive would need exceptionally compelling, rational, and objective grounds. Key points emphasized by the Court:
- A mere disagreement by the executive with a judicial decision is not a lawful basis to overturn it.
- FOIA’s special veto must be exercised only in truly exceptional circumstances and very narrowly.
- Royal neutrality is a relevant factor, but it cannot override the core principles of the rule of law.
Significance: Re-articulating royal neutrality, transparency, and the rule of law
R (Evans) is not merely a disclosure case; it clarified key constitutional principles — the rule of law, the authority of the judiciary, royal neutrality, and transparency in government records. The Supreme Court criticized the Attorney General’s use of the veto because it effectively nullified a judicial order, reaffirming that “the executive cannot stand above judicial determinations.” It also emphasized that protecting royal neutrality is not an unlimited exception and that the public’s right to know about matters of public interest reflects FOIA’s fundamental spirit. This judgment has significantly influenced policy-making and day-to-day practice surrounding disclosure in the UK.
Evans — Evaluation and Critique Table
Although widely welcomed by scholars and the media, some argue that the judgment unduly narrowed the intended purpose of the veto and the executive’s discretion. The table below summarizes major points of praise and criticism.
| Praise/Critique | Details |
|---|---|
| Strengthening judicial authority | Clarifies that the executive cannot overturn court rulings, protecting separation of powers |
| Preventing abuse of the veto | Sets strict thresholds for invoking FOIA section 53 |
| Debate over narrowed executive discretion | Some criticize the Court for intruding too far into policy judgments |
Practical Implications for public records, royal papers, and administrative review
Evans significantly shifted the long-standing practice of treating royal papers as confidential by default. To protect royal-related documents or other sensitive public records in the future, the executive must show legal grounds and objective necessity — not mere political preference. In FOIA and EIR practice, using a veto to “overturn a court order” has become virtually impossible, and refusals must be justified within a much narrower scope. Here are key practitioner takeaways:
- The government’s special veto should be used only in truly exceptional circumstances.
- Even royal papers can be disclosed where transparency and the rule of law demand it.
- In information-rights reviews and judicial review, Evans remains a leading authority.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
Because it addressed a fundamental constitutional question: can the executive overturn a court’s decision? The Supreme Court safeguarded the rule of law by tightly limiting the veto.
No. But after Evans, it is interpreted so narrowly that, in practice, it is almost never usable.
Historically they were often withheld, but after Evans, transparency and public interest carry greater weight, and disclosure can follow judicial scrutiny.
The executive’s discretion under section 53 was drastically curtailed, and public authorities must now provide much more rigorous reasons to justify refusal.
Very much so. Executive efforts to neutralise judicial decisions undermine separation of powers; the Supreme Court firmly checked that.
Yes. Following the Supreme Court’s decision, most of the memos were released, prompting significant public discussion and media coverage.
Conclusion: Evans’s message for a “transparent constitutional order”
R (Evans) v. Attorney General gets more interesting the more you study it. It was never just about whether to disclose royal papers; it asked the foundational question: “Can the executive stand above judicial judgment?” In the end, the Supreme Court sided with transparency and the rule of law, re-affirming the direction of UK public law. Keep this case in mind — it helps you navigate complex themes like information rights, separation of powers, and royal practice. If you’d like related cases to read together (e.g., Privacy International, Miller, Cherry), tell me and I’ll connect the dots!
No comments:
Post a Comment