McCann v. United Kingdom (1995): The boundary between the right to life and national security
“A shot fired to prevent terror—was it truly justified?” — This question led to one of the European Court of Human Rights’ most controversial judgments.
Hello, I’m Bora, exploring the complex balance between human rights and security. Today we’ll look at the leading right-to-life case of the European Court of Human Rights, McCann and Others v. United Kingdom (1995). The case arose from the killing of IRA operatives in Gibraltar in 1988, and the core issue was whether the state’s use of lethal force to prevent terrorism complied with Article 2 (right to life) of the European Convention on Human Rights. In post–Cold War Europe, amid the tense era of the Northern Ireland conflict, we now trace how the “state’s trigger” ended up before a court of law.
Table of Contents
Background of the case and on-scene circumstances
In March 1988, in the narrow area linking Spain and the British territory of Gibraltar, three IRA operatives — McCann, Farrell, and Savage — were shot dead by the UK Special Air Service (SAS). UK authorities believed they were preparing a car-bomb attack and ordered the use of force for an urgent response. It later emerged, however, that there was no bomb in the vehicle.
At the time, the Northern Ireland conflict was still trapped in a vicious cycle of violence and retaliation, and the UK government allowed broad military responses under the banner of preventing terrorism. Yet questions arose: “If the bomb could have been neutralized beforehand, why did it come to killing?” The UK’s actions thus became the subject of an international debate over potential human-rights violations.
Legal issues and the parties’ arguments
The crux lay in interpreting Article 2 (right to life) of the ECHR. The government argued that the use of lethal force was a “lawful and necessary measure,” while the families contended that there was adequate intelligence and non-lethal alternatives which the government disregarded.
| Issue | Applicants (families) | Respondent (UK Government) |
|---|---|---|
| Whether the right to life was violated | The shootings were unnecessary and amounted to excessive force | A legitimate defensive act to prevent terrorism |
| Adequacy of prior planning | The operation was approved on the basis of flawed intelligence | Within informational limits, the authorities made the best decision |
Ultimately, the core question was whether the state may sacrifice life to prevent terror. It was not merely about a military operation; it was about how far violence can be justified in the name of law.
The ECtHR’s decision and reasoning
In September 1995, by a narrow margin of 10–9, the ECtHR found that the UK had violated Article 2. The Court focused not on the individual actions of soldiers at the moment of the operation, but on the adequacy of the government’s decision-making and operational planning in advance. In other words, even if the actual shootings might have been lawful, the state bore responsibility for creating the situation through flawed intelligence and preparation.
- Article 2 encompasses not only a prohibition on unlawful killing but also a preventive duty to protect life.
- Deficiencies in intelligence verification and risk assessment before an operation constitute systemic state fault.
- Even for counter-terrorism, interferences with the right to life must be minimized.
The ruling sparked intense debate. Some criticized the Court for ignoring the “realities of the field,” while others praised it for setting a new standard that human rights must prevail over security concerns.
Expanded interpretation of the right to life and state obligations
McCann is widely regarded as the case in which the ECtHR fundamentally redefined the meaning of Article 2. It extended beyond “unlawful killing” to include the state’s preventive obligation. Put differently, governments must actively manage risks to protect life and make rights-conscious judgments at the planning stage of operations.
This principle has since been directly reflected in military operations, policing, and counter-terrorism manuals across Europe. The right to life has shifted from a merely “reactive protection” to a state responsibility centered on prevention.
Related cases and subsequent influence
Following McCann, the ECtHR continued to emphasize states’ “organizational responsibility” in right-to-life cases. The cases below lie on that continuum.
| Case | Core point | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Ergi v. Turkey (1998) | Article 2 violation found where civilians died during an operation due to poor intelligence and planning | Direct application of McCann principles |
| Finogenov v. Russia (2011) | Critique of excessive state force in an extreme terror incident (Moscow hostage crisis) | Establishment of proportionality standards for operations |
This trajectory fostered a new legal paradigm: “national security” and “human-rights protection” are not opposites but must be harmonized.
Contemporary significance and human-rights discourse
Today, McCann is still cited as a legal benchmark in contexts such as policing, military intervention, and counter-terrorism. The point is not simply to assess the justification of gunfire, but to insist that the state’s entire decision-making system must be human-rights-oriented.
- The right to life has expanded from “negative protection” to “active prevention.”
- Any use of force by the state must always be tested against the principles of proportionality and necessity.
- McCann now informs modern security issues such as drone strikes and border control.
In the end, the case asks: “What are we prepared to give up for safety—and if it is life, can that ever be justified?”
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
Article 2 (right to life) of the ECHR. The Court read it to include the state’s “positive obligation” to protect life.
Because the Court focused less on the immediate legality of the shootings and more on failings in operational design. Some said it ignored security realities.
It found negligence in intelligence analysis and planning and concluded that non-lethal alternatives were not adequately considered.
Similar principles were applied in cases involving deaths during military or police operations in countries such as Turkey, Russia, and France, emphasizing state duties of planning and control.
It means the state must take reasonable measures—intelligence vetting, planning, proportionality review—to protect life, not merely refrain from unlawful killing.
It remains a standard for assessing proportionality and prior responsibility in modern security contexts such as drone strikes, counter-terrorism, and crowd control.
Closing: What it means to pull the trigger of justice
McCann poses an uncomfortable question: Is the “barrel of the state” always aimed at justice? In a time rife with terror and threat, the UK justified itself with the logic of “shoot first.” The ECtHR overturned that logic, asserting the principle that “Life is what the state must protect, not a tool for its calculations.” The case shows that human rights may not always yield perfect answers, but they can remain a “mirror” that constantly interrogates the limits of state power. Today, whenever we seek to restrict others’ rights in the name of safety, the name McCann quietly surfaces. Before we pull the trigger of justice, have we deliberated enough?
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