Employment Division v. Smith (1990): Free Exercise and the Clash with Neutral Laws
If an action taken for religious reasons violates a generally applicable law, how far does constitutional protection extend?
Hello! Today I’m looking at one of the most debated free-exercise cases, Employment Division v. Smith (1990). When I first studied it, I wondered, “How far should the law accommodate religion?” Members of the Native American Church used peyote during a religious ceremony, were fired, and were later denied unemployment benefits. The Supreme Court framed the dispute not simply as a question of religious liberty, but as one about “neutral and generally applicable laws,” and announced a new standard.
Contents
Background
The case arose in Oregon. Alfred Smith and a colleague, members of the Native American Church, used peyote (a cactus with hallucinogenic properties) in a religious ceremony. Oregon law prohibited peyote use, and they were fired. When they later applied for unemployment benefits, the state denied their claims, stating that termination for illegal drug use counts as a voluntary rules violation. Smith sued, arguing that his conduct was protected by the Free Exercise Clause, and the case reached the Supreme Court.
Issues & Legal Questions
The central question was whether the First Amendment requires exemptions when a neutral, generally applicable law restricts religiously motivated conduct. Earlier cases suggested the government needed a “compelling interest” to burden religious exercise, but Smith revisited that approach.
| Side | Argument | Key Issue |
|---|---|---|
| Smith (Plaintiff) | Using peyote was part of a religious ceremony; denying benefits on that basis infringed free exercise. | Scope of free exercise protection |
| State of Oregon (Defendant) | The law did not target any religion and applied generally; therefore it was constitutional. | Primacy of neutral, generally applicable laws |
Decision & Reasoning
In a 6–3 decision, the Court ruled for Oregon. It held that even religiously motivated conduct is not exempt from a valid, neutral, and generally applicable law. In other words, religious reasons do not automatically entitle someone to violate generally applicable laws. The decision effectively displaced the prior “compelling interest” test as a constitutional requirement in this context.
- Neutral, generally applicable laws apply equally to religious conduct.
- Free exercise does not provide a blanket exemption from otherwise valid laws.
- The Court replaced strict scrutiny in this setting with a new interpretation.
The ruling clarified limits on free exercise and sparked fresh debate over the relationship between law and religion.
Impact
Employment Division v. Smith is widely seen as a turning point. After the decision, it became harder to claim constitutional protection for violations of general laws based on religious motivation. Civil liberties and religious groups strongly criticized the ruling as too restrictive. In response, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993 to restore the “compelling interest” test. But in 1997, City of Boerne v. Flores limited RFRA’s application to the states; thereafter, many states adopted their own RFRA-style statutes.
Related Cases
Compared to earlier and later decisions, Smith marks a pivot in free-exercise doctrine.
| Case | Key Issue | Holding |
|---|---|---|
| Sherbert v. Verner (1963) | Refusal to work on Saturday for religious reasons | Unconstitutional — compelling interest required |
| Employment Division v. Smith (1990) | Use of illegal drugs in a religious ceremony | Constitutional — no exemptions from neutral laws |
| City of Boerne v. Flores (1997) | Scope of RFRA’s application to the states | Unconstitutional — RFRA cannot be applied to the states |
Modern Significance
Today, Smith remains central to debates over balancing religious liberty and the rule of law. It clarified that religious belief does not authorize violations of generally applicable laws. At the same time, the decision galvanized political and legal responses, spurring new legislation and case law around free exercise.
- A starting point for modern discussions about the scope and limits of free exercise
- Triggered RFRA and the spread of state-level RFRA laws
- Highlights the tension between legal neutrality and religious diversity
- Continues to influence recent disputes (e.g., healthcare, corporate religious rights)
FAQ
Members of the Native American Church were fired after using the illegal drug peyote in a religious ceremony and were denied unemployment benefits.
That even religiously motivated conduct must comply with neutral, generally applicable laws; the Constitution does not automatically provide exemptions.
It overturned the routine use of the “compelling interest” test in this context and marked a shift in free-exercise doctrine.
Congress passed RFRA in 1993 to strengthen protections, but its application to the states was limited by City of Boerne v. Flores.
RFRA was enacted in reaction to Smith to restore stronger statutory protection for religious exercise.
Smith is a touchstone for balancing free exercise with the rule of law and is frequently cited in modern religious-liberty disputes.
Conclusion
Today we examined Employment Division v. Smith (1990), a case that starkly illustrates how courts respond when religious liberty collides with legal norms. It prompted me to ask, “Can religious conviction stand above the law?” While Smith narrowed constitutional protection for religiously motivated conduct, it also sparked political and legal pushback, including RFRA and subsequent developments. Ultimately, the case invites us to consider how a democracy should navigate the tension between free exercise and the rule of law. What do you think? How far should the law accommodate religion? Share your thoughts!
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